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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Equity Funding debacle, like all disasters caused by human 
actions, offers the promise of useful lessons for the future. Of particu­
lar concern to the accounting profession is what may be learned from 
this debacle about the adequacy of standards governing the work of 
independent auditors.
The dimensions of the Equity Funding disaster and the general 
nature of its causes were revealed within a period of a few weeks in the 
spring of 1973. In March of that year, press reports questioned the 
integrity of the consolidated financial statements and other records and 
reports of the apparently successful Equity Funding Corporation of 
America (EFCA) and its subsidiaries, including Equity Funding Life 
Insurance Company (EFLIC). Within a month, on April 4, the parent 
company filed a petition in bankruptcy. It appeared by then that a 
fraud of substantial proportion had been carried out over several years 
by certain officers and employees of the Equity Funding companies. 
The result of the fraud was to present to investors, creditors and regu­
lators a picture of ever-increasing earnings and assets and to stimulate 
an active market in the securities of the parent corporation. It is now 
apparent that much of the reported earnings and assets were false. 
EFCA’s publicly held securities, with a previous market value in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, are now virtually worthless.
The Equity Funding collapse brought on a host of legal proceed­
ings, many of which are likely to go on for years. In addition to the 
bankruptcy proceedings, there have been investigations by insurance 
regulatory agencies of several states, as well as by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and other federal agencies, grand jury investi­
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gations which have resulted in the indictment and in some cases convic­
tion of corporate officers and employees; the indictment of certain of 
the auditors;* disciplinary proceedings by the New York Stock Ex­
change; and scores of civil lawsuits.
A number of questions are raised by this disaster. In addition to 
criminal culpability and civil liability, the questions involve the suffi­
ciency of regulatory procedures affecting publicly owned companies, 
including life insurance companies, and the adequacy of prevailing 
assumptions about the responsibilities of various kinds of professions 
and occupations—including accountants, lawyers, actuaries, investment 
bankers and securities analysts—in relation to enterprises like Equity 
Funding.
Some of these questions concern standards governing the work of 
the public accounting profession, for EFCA had published annual con­
solidated financial statements through December 31, 1971 giving a false 
and misleading picture of its operations and financial position. These 
financial statements had carried reports by independent auditors which 
indicated that the financial statements had been examined in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards and were presented fairly in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The exami­
nation of the consolidated financial statements which were to be in­
cluded in the 1972 annual report was substantially complete and printer’s 
proofs were prepared. However, the consolidated financial statements 
and the auditors’ report thereon were never issued.
On May 5, 1973, the Board of Directors of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, recognizing the importance of the 
questions raised with respect to the adequacy of prevailing professional 
standards, resolved that the president of the Institute should appoint 
a special committee to study whether auditing standards applicable to 
the examination of financial statements should be changed in the light 
of Equity Funding. The Board’s resolution was as follows:
w h e r e a s ,  the Institute shares the general public concern about the 
Equity Funding disaster, which caused enormous losses to investors and 
creditors apparently by reason of massive and collusive fraud; and
w h e r e a s ,  developments in the Equity Funding matter may suggest 
that changes in generally accepted auditing standards are called for; and
w h e r e a s , id e n t i f ic a t io n  a n d  im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  a n y  s u c h  c h a n g e s  in
* On May 20, 1975 a federal district court jury returned a verdict of guilty in a 
trial o f three of the accountants involved with Equity Funding.
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generally accepted auditing standards should not await the eventual 
resolution of litigation or other proceedings concerned with assigning 
responsibility in respect of Equity Funding.
n o w  t h e r e f o r e  b e  i t  r e s o l v e d ,  that a special committee be ap­
pointed by the president of the Institute to study whether the auditing 
standards which are currently considered appropriate and sufficient in 
the examination of financial statements should be changed in the light of 
Equity Funding, and report its conclusions to the Board of Directors 
and the auditing standards executive committee.
The appointment of the special committee to consider the possible 
larger implications of Equity Funding should not be understood as in­
volving any deviation from the Institute’s customary procedure for 
dealing with possible departures from the requirements of the Code of 
Professional Ethics. Accordingly, any questions raised by the Equity 
Funding matter as to adherence to professional standards by members 
of the Institute will be handled by the division of professional ethics.
This is the report of the special committee appointed pursuant to 
that resolution.
The Committee’s Charge
As the resolution of the Institute’s Board makes clear, the com­
mittee was not charged with attempting to assess fault or legal respon­
sibility of the accountants or firms involved. Its charge was to consider 
whether the Equity Funding matter suggested a need for changes in 
generally accepted auditing standards.
The phrase “generally accepted auditing standards” refers to the 
ten standards which were formally adopted by the membership of the 
Institute in 1948 and 1949. These standards—three “General Stan­
dards,” three “Standards of Field Work,” and four “Standards of Re­
porting”— are explained and interpreted in a substantial body of pro­
fessional literature of which the most authoritative is a series of 
pronouncements of the Institute set forth in its Statements on Auditing 
Standards.
The committee has understood its charge to require appraisal not 
only of the ten standards, but more particularly of the auditing proce­
dures by means of which auditing standards are implemented. The 
Institute’s Board of Directors has confirmed this understanding.
There were two aspects of this appraisal— one particular and the 
other general. The first focused on the auditing procedures that would 
customarily have been applied in the circumstances; the other involved
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consideration of the general question of the auditor’s responsibility to 
detect fraud.
The specific questions that the committee sought to answer were 
these:
1. What was the nature of the fraud in Equity Funding and how was 
it accomplished?
2. Would customary auditing procedures provide a reasonable expec­
tation of detecting such a fraud?
3. Are any changes in customary auditing procedures called for in 
order to provide such a reasonable expectation?
4. Finally, and more generally, is there a need for change in scope of 
an auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud, or for clarifi­
cation of the auditor’s responsibility, for the benefit of the account­
ing profession and the public at large?
The Conduct of the Committee’s Study
To answer these questions, the committee did not consider it 
necessary to conduct an audit of the financial statements of any of the 
Equity Funding entities. In any event, to perform an audit for the 
years in which the fraud occurred would probably have been impractical 
if not impossible. The auditors appointed by the bankruptcy court 
completed an audit as of the date of bankruptcy. Their audit report 
appears in the Report of the Trustee of Equity Funding Corporation 
of America dated February 22, 1974.
The committee also did not determine what procedures actually 
were followed by the auditors of the Equity Funding entities since deter­
mination of fault, if any, was not part of its charge. To fulfill its pur­
poses, the committee needed to gather information only with respect to 
the nature of the fraud and to relate this information to its under­
standing of the auditing procedures that would customarily have been 
applied in the examination of the financial statements of the Equity 
Funding entities.
The information needed for the study was obtained from the 
February 22 and October 31, 1974 reports of the Trustee of Equity 
Funding Corporation of America and through interviews with his execu­
tive staff, representatives of the auditing firm engaged by the Trustee, 
representatives of the California and Illinois Insurance Departments, 
the conservator for the life insurance subsidiary (EFLIC) and certain
of his staff, and some of the Equity Funding personnel who had been 
retained by the Trustee and the conservator.
The committee’s representatives also looked at some of the 
records of the Equity Funding entities for the purpose of understanding 
the manner in which certain transactions were recorded on the books of 
the companies. Access to these records was granted by the Trustee and 
the conservator.
The committee’s conclusions in this report necessarily rest upon the 
information in the reports of the Trustee and the information gathered 
in interviews and other investigations. If that information subsequently 
turns out to be inaccurate, the conclusions could be affected.
The committee generally limited its study to the pertinent Equity 
Funding entities for the years 1971 and 1972. Although it appears 
that the fraud began as early as 1964, the committee concluded that for 
its purposes it would be neither practicable nor necessary to extend its 
study to years before 1971 or into 1973, for the committee understands 
that the general pattern of the fraud which had appeared in earlier 
years or in 1973, could be identified without extending the review 
beyond these two years.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Equity Funding
To provide background for the detailed discussion which follows, 
it will be useful to describe briefly the Equity Funding operation and 
the committee’s understanding of the pattern and magnitude of the 
fraud.
Description of the Operation
The initial EFCA operation, which began in 1959 with the com­
bination of two small securities and insurance marketing organizations, 
was that of an independent sales company which marketed mutual fund 
shares, life insurance policies and funded programs combining the two. 
During the early period of the company’s history, substantially all of its 
income was derived from commissions earned. EFCA’s expenses in 
connection with the sales of mutual fund shares and life insurance con­
sisted principally of commissions paid to agents, the cost of maintain­
ing a marketing organization, the cost of administering funded programs 
and interest on borrowed money. In the ensuing years the sale of 
funded programs became the most important part of the Equity Fund­
ing operation. The acquisition of Equity Funding Life Insurance Com­
pany (EFLIC) late in 1967 made it possible for EFCA subsequently to 
project a corporate image not simply of a marketing organization but 
rather of a life insurance-based conglomerate.
The following paragraphs describe the accounting procedures fol­
lowed to record legitimate transactions.
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As previously noted the most significant part of the operation was 
the “Equity Funding Program,” which involved the combined sale of 
mutual fund shares and life insurance. Under the “program” an inves­
tor would, for example, purchase mutual fund shares for $1,000, pledge 
these shares as collateral for a loan of $400, and use the $400 to pay 
the first annual premium on a life insurance policy. Subsequently pur­
chased mutual fund shares could be similarly pledged to obtain new 
loans to finance renewal premiums. Customers were required to main­
tain a prescribed ratio of collateral to their loans. This arrangement 
offered investors the opportunity to purchase mutual fund shares in 
anticipation that dividends and appreciation would exceed the interest 
cost of the loan used to pay insurance premiums. Investors sometimes 
purchased more mutual fund shares than were required under the 
“program,” expecting to use the excess investment to collateralize fu­
ture loans to pay insurance premiums for subsequent years.
EFCA and three of its subsidiaries, a broker-dealer organization, 
a marketing organization and an insurance underwriter, were principally 
involved in this operation. The mutual fund shares were sold through 
Equity Funding Securities Corporation (EFSC) and insurance was mar­
keted by Equity Funding Corporation-California (EFC-Cal). After 
1967 the insurance was issued in most instances by Equity Funding Life 
Insurance Company (EFLIC), although EFC-Cal also marketed insur­
ance of unrelated companies, both separately and under the “program.”
The Trustee determined that loans receivable from “program” 
sales (funded loans receivable) were legally assets of EFCA. However, 
since EFC-Cal maintained all funded loan records and dealt directly 
with policyholder/borrowers, funded loan transactions for purposes of 
simplicity are treated throughout this report as transactions of EFC-Cal 
rather than of EFCA.
EFSC’s income was derived from commissions on sales of mutual 
fund shares while EFC-Cal’s income was derived from commissions on 
sales of insurance. On mutual fund sales, EFSC generally received a 
7% dealer’s commission, 50% of which went to the selling agent. Thus, 
EFSC’s books showed commission income from transactions equal to 
7% of the offering price, commission expense equal to 3.5% and an 
increase in cash of 3.5%. The difference between the offering price 
and the 7% commission retained by EFSC was paid to the mutual 
fund distributor to purchase the participants’ shares.
On “program” insurance written by EFLIC, EFC-Cal’s commis­
sions were substantially equal to the first year’s premium and were pay­
able in the first year. Therefore, in a policy’s first year no cash was
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actually transferred between EFC-Cal and EFLIC in payment of the 
premium and commission, respectively, since the amount of the pre­
mium payable to EFLIC was offset by the amount of the commission 
due to EFC-Cal for sale of the policy. In subsequent policy years, 
EFLIC was entitled to receive the gross insurance premiums because 
no commissions were payable on renewal premiums. Since on “pro­
gram” sales EFC-Cal received promissory notes rather than cash from 
policyholders, cash was raised by bank borrowings. The bank loans 
were secured by the policyholder notes and the mutual fund shares 
with which those notes were collateralized.
Thus “program” sales by EFC-Cal of EFLIC policies would be 
reflected on EFC-Cal’s books in the first year by an intercompany 
payable to EFLIC for the premium and an offsetting receivable from 
EFLIC for the commissions; and on EFLIC’s books by intercompany 
receivables and payables for the same items. EFC-Cal would in the first 
year record income in the amount of the commission and a correspond­
ing increase in funded loans receivable. Correspondingly, EFLIC 
would reflect premium income and commissions paid and its inventory 
of insurance in force would be increased for the policies written.
In subsequent years, premiums received by EFC-Cal, again in the 
form of promissory notes, would be similarly recorded as an inter­
company payable to EFLIC. At the time a policyholder’s loan was 
increased for the renewal premium, an entry would be made on 
EFC-Cal’s books increasing funded loans receivable, with an offsetting 
increase in the amount payable to EFLIC. EFLIC, on the other hand, 
would record the amount of the gross premium as an intercompany 
receivable from EFC-Cal, and as renewal premium income.
The intercompany accounts were settled through the parent, EFCA, 
and not directly between the subsidiary entities. Settlements were made 
before year-end because in the case of EFLIC intercompany receivables 
are “non-admitted” assets for regulatory purposes. Such receivables are 
not treated as assets in determining whether minimum statutory capital 
requirements applicable to life insurance companies have been met.
It was the practice of EFLIC to reinsure with other insurance com­
panies all or a portion of the risks on insurance policies it had issued. 
These reinsurers paid EFLIC approximately 180% of the first year’s 
premium on reinsured policies. Since EFLIC retained the first year 
premiums, reinsurers actually paid cash equal to approximately 80% 
of the first year’s premium on reinsured policies. The reinsurers then 
assumed responsibility for future benefits and claims on these policies. 
This enabled EFLIC to reduce its liability for future benefits and claims
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to policyholders. Under the reinsurance agreements, EFLIC remained 
responsible for collecting subsequent years’ premiums, for which it re­
ceived a service charge. In many instances, EFLIC guaranteed a “per­
sistency rate”— that is, the proportion of the policies on which premiums 
would continue to be paid— as high as 85% in the policies’ second year.
Cash receipts from reinsurers, approximately 80% of the first 
year’s premium on reinsured policies, provided EFLIC with substantial 
cash flow and increased earnings.
General Description of the Fraud
Prior to 1971 Equity Funding personnel began falsifying records 
to improve reported income and increase assets—presumably for the 
purpose of maintaining and encouraging the market for EFCA’s securi­
ties. The falsification consisted of a number of elements; the two most 
significant involved the recording of fictitious funded loans receivable, 
which appears to have begun as early as 1964, and the recording of 
fictitious insurance policies, which began in 1969.
During the years 1964 through 1969 EFC-Cal’s books were falsi­
fied to show increases in funded loans receivable and commission income 
accounts which purported to represent the company’s participation in 
commissions earned by brokerage houses from various “program” 
securities transactions. Supposedly because it was improper for the 
company to receive such reciprocal commissions, they were disguised as 
funded loans receivable in EFCA’s financial statements.
After 1969, a different approach to falsifying funded loans and 
commission income was adopted. This involved the recording of false 
receivables purporting to reflect loans made to pay policy premiums 
and recording a corresponding amount of fictitious commission income.
EFC-Cal was generally not entitled to receive commissions on 
renewal premiums; however, it appears that such premiums on fictitious 
policies were improperly recorded as commissions earned. EFC-Cal’s 
commission income account was further falsified to reflect commissions 
on fictitious sales of mutual fund shares. Since EFSC sold most of the 
mutual fund shares used to secure the funded loans receivable, commis­
sions on such sales would normally be recorded on its books and not on 
EFC-Cal’s books.
As of the date of bankruptcy, April 5, 1973, fictitious funded loans 
receivable amounted to approximately $62.3 million.
Other fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets, principally in the 
form of receivables and investments approximating $37.7 million, were 
recorded on the books of EFCA and EFC-Cal. The recording of sub­
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stantially all of these fictitious assets resulted in direct or indirect reduc­
tion of other fictitious asset accounts, especially funded loans receivable.
Beginning in 1969 EFLIC’s records were falsified to reflect an 
increase in the insurance in force. This falsification did not by itself 
result in the recording of net income to EFLIC in the first year of the 
fictitious policies. However, when EFLIC reinsured the fictitious poli­
cies, the cash received (approximately 80% of the purported first year’s 
premiums) was recognized as gross income. Reinsurance of fictitious 
policies made it necessary for EFLIC to make payment of subsequent 
years’ premiums on those policies to the reinsurers. The need for cash 
to make these payments led to the creation of still more fictitious poli­
cies which were also reinsured, with much of the cash generated from 
the reinsurance being applied to payment of premiums attributable to 
fictitious policies reinsured in prior years.
Thus, in the absence of other sources of cash flow, each year’s 
fraud required an even larger fraud the following year, with the magni­
tude of the falsification pyramiding from year to year.
The falsifications on EFLIC and EFC-Cal records represented two 
separate efforts to inflate assets and income. Fictitious transactions 
which would normally have required corresponding entries on the 
records of the two entities were not correlated either as to their nature 
or as to the amounts involved, and documentation supporting the falsi­
fications apparently was not prepared except when requested by the 
auditors.
EFLIC’s intercompany accounts would generally show a substan­
tial net receivable balance, created by transfers of cash to EFCA and 
by the excess of premiums owed it by EFC-Cal over commissions 
EFLIC owed to EFC-Cal. In 1971, EFCA settled such accounts by a 
cash transfer of $16 million to EFLIC. This transfer was falsely re­
corded by EFCA as a purchase of commercial paper. In 1972, the 
books of EFLIC reflected an intercompany account receivable of $24 
million. This balance was supposedly paid by the transfer of marketable 
securities from EFCA to EFLIC. These securities, like the insurance 
policies, funded loans and commercial paper, were fictitious. In 1972, 
EFCA also recorded fictitious purchases of commercial paper totaling 
$8 million in order to bring its intercompany accounts into balance with 
those of its subsidiaries.
The Magnitude of the Fraud
The magnitude of the fraud is indicated by the following summary 
of fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets based on the February 22,
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1974, report of the Trustee. (When these items are discussed here­
after, some of the dollar amounts vary slightly because they represent 
the balances as of December 31, 1972, while the Trustee’s report 
reflects amounts as of April 5, 1973.)
(millions)
Inflated funded loans receivable $ 62.3
Other fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets:
Receivable from Compania de Estudios y
Asuntos (Estudios) $12.7
Receivable from Establissement Grandson
(Grandson) 9.1
Investment in commercial paper—Apatinska
Tekstilna Industrijia (Apatex) 2.0
Capitalized mineral exploration costs 1.8
Receivable from insurance companies and
agents 5.9
Receivable originating from the sale of cas­
ualty insurance agency operation 2.9 
Investment in Bishops Bank 2.7 
Receivables from mutual funds .6 37.7
Write off by EFCA of carrying value of invest­
ment in EFLIC (see discussion of fictitious 
securities recorded on books of EFCA and 
EFLIC in 1971 and 1972 in connection 
with the elimination of intercompany ac­
counts) 35.4 
Non-existent investments in commercial paper 8.0
Total $143.4
The Trustee also adjusted other accounts by $42.1 million repre­
senting write-downs of assets and other adjustments not necessarily 
related to fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets; thus, net assets were 
reduced by a total of $185.5 million.
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Chapter 3
The Nature of the Fraud 
And How It Was Accomplished
As stated in Chapter 1, the fraud at Equity Funding began as 
early as 1964. However, the committee generally limited its study 
to the pertinent entities for the years 1971 and 1972 since the general 
pattern of the fraud which had appeared in earlier years or in 1973 
could be identified without extending the review beyond these two years.
Funded Loans Receivable
The falsification of funded loans receivable accounts and corres­
ponding commission accounts was accomplished in a simple manner. 
The general ledger control accounts were falsified by recording fictitious 
journal entries and there was virtually no attempt to create supporting 
documentation. For example, the subsidiary loan accounts were not 
falsified to correlate with the general ledger control account; neither 
were memoranda collateral records prepared to support the required 
ratio of collateral to funded loans receivable.
At the end of 1971 and 1972, funded loans receivable accounted 
for about 14% of Equity Funding’s total consolidated assets. In 1971, 
approximately $34 million of the loans— 49% —were fictitious; and in 
1972, $61 million— 61%. A related amount of collateral in each year 
was also non-existent.
The sale by EFC-Cal of insurance policies involving funded loans 
receivable generated commission income and expense. False sales of
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funding programs were recorded by fictitiously increasing the funded 
loans receivable account with corresponding increases in the commission 
income accounts. Although commission income from sales of insurance 
and mutual fund shares normally would have resulted in incurring com­
mission expense, the commission expense accounts do not appear to 
have been falsified so as to maintain their expected relationship to 
commission income. However, other expenses were apparently reclassi­
fied as commission expense when data for the various entities were 
consolidated, so that the consolidated financial statements reflected the 
expected relationship.
Interest income on funded loans was recorded monthly by EFC- 
Cal on the aggregate loan balance and was therefore overstated to the 
extent it was computed on fictitious loans.
During the examination of EFCA’s 1972 financial statements, 
EFC-Cal personnel used the computer to prepare, for the auditor’s 
use, a detailed trial balance listing all the individual loans supposedly 
included in the total of the funded loans receivable general ledger con­
trol account. This false trial balance was created by listing the legitimate 
loans a sufficient number of times until the desired total was reached. 
To avoid detection of this duplication, the listing omitted borrowers’ 
names and the first two digits of each five-digit loan number. Although 
the trial balance contained numerous duplications, each line item could 
be supported by genuine documents (principally the power of attorney 
and promissory notes signed by the borrower) contained in a legitimate 
individual loan file. There was, however, the risk that the auditors, in 
selecting individual loans for testing from the trial balance, would 
select the same loan more than once. The committee was informed 
that when this occurred company personnel presented either genuine 
documentation for other loans having the same balance and a loan 
number with the same last three digits, or counterfeit documentation.
A deceptive measure was also apparently taken by company 
personnel in connection with the auditors’ direct confirmation of se­
lected loans with the borrowers. The committee was informed that when 
the loan selected by the auditors was fictitious (that is, a repetitive list­
ing of a genuine loan also selected for confirmation), a confirmation 
request would be prepared and addressed to company personnel or their 
friends who were instructed to make appropriate response. Thus, 
through collusion, the risk of exceptions to confirmation requests was 
minimized.
Such preventive measures to avoid detection of the fraud were 
not, however, systematically carried out in the books of EFC-Cal.
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Journal entries recording fictitious commission income on EFC-Cal’s 
books were not consistent with EFC-Cal’s method of operation in at 
least two ways. First, large amounts of commission on supposed sales 
of mutual fund shares were recorded by journal entries which inex­
plicably increased funded loans receivable. Commissions on mutual 
fund sales would normally be received in cash, not by an increase in 
notes receivable from customers. Furthermore as previously noted, 
commissions from the sales of mutual fund shares would be expected 
to be recorded on the books of EFSC, not EFC-Cal. Secondly, EFC- 
Cal recorded additions to funded loans receivable representing gross 
renewal premiums on program policies as insurance commission in­
come. Since EFC-Cal was not entitled to receive commissions on the 
renewal of EFLIC policies, all such additions to funded loans receivable 
should have been recorded as payable to EFLIC instead of as commis­
sion income.
Other Fictitious Assets 
Related to Funded Loans Receivable
At the date of bankruptcy the accounts of EFC-Cal reflected the 
following fictitious assets which were created by journal entries that 
directly or indirectly reduced fictitious funded loans receivable by a 
corresponding amount:
•  a receivable of $12.7 million from a Panamanian company, 
Estudios,
•  a note receivable of $9.1 million from a Liechtenstein company,  
Grandson,
•  an investment of $2 million in commercial paper of a Yugo­
slavian company, Apatex,
•  capitalized mineral exploration costs of $1.8 million.
The manner in which the receivables from Estudios and Grandson 
were recorded raises questions about their validity. The bookkeeping 
entries relating to these receivables are summarized in the following 
paragraphs.
During 1969 and 1970 EFC-Cal’s purported right to receive com­
missions on “programs” established in prior years was recorded as 
“contractual receivable” and commission income was increased by 
approximately the same amount. During 1970, the “contractual re­
ceivable” were ostensibly sold for $18 million to Estudios, a company
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which the Trustee has determined was secretly controlled by EFCA. 
It appears that the purpose of these entries was merely to present a 
picture of ever-increasing earnings and assets.
The original Estudios receivable of $18 million was reduced to 
approximately $12.7 million by the end of 1972 apparently by treating 
an unrelated $2 million cash transfer from Bishops Bank, another 
EFCA subsidiary, as though it were a payment on this receivable and 
by applying actual commissions received on sales made in prior periods.
In 1969, EFCA borrowed approximately $9.1 million through an 
international brokerage firm. The proceeds of the loan were not re­
corded as a liability but were recorded instead as a reduction of funded 
loans receivable. The committee was informed that the liability was not 
recorded until the lender subsequently asked why the obligation did not 
appear on the borrowers’ financial statements. The liability was then 
recorded in 1970 with an offsetting charge to a new asset account pur­
porting to represent a loan receivable from Grandson. The net effect 
of these entries was to reduce funded loans receivable and create a new 
fictitious asset of a corresponding amount. The Trustee has determined 
that, like Estudios, Grandson was secretly controlled by EFCA. The 
purpose of these entries appears to have been concealment of the fraud 
and manipulation of earnings.
The committee has been informed that there are agreements in 
EFCA’s files to document these non-interest bearing receivables from 
Estudios and Grandson. Attempts by the Trustee to locate the corporate 
officers, obtain financial statements or identify any operations by either 
company have been unsuccessful. The committee understands that the 
receivables due from Estudios and Grandson are worthless and that the 
companies are corporate shells without assets.
The creation of the investment in the commercial paper of Apatex 
appears to be related to the $2 million transfer from Bishops Bank to 
EFC-Cal, which was recorded as a down payment on the sale of the 
“contractuals receivable” to Estudios. Subsequent to this transfer, the 
$2 million was repaid to Bishops Bank and the disbursement improperly 
recorded as a purchase of Apatex commercial paper. Bishops normally 
traded in the commercial paper of Apatex and apparently supplied a 
false purchase advice indicating that the securities were being held by 
Bishops for safekeeping. These transactions resulted in the substitution 
of what the Trustee has determined to be a fictitious investment in 
Apatex for a fictitious receivable due from Estudios in the amount of 
$2 million and were apparently designed to make it appear that the 
Estudios note was collectible.
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In November 1970, journal entries further reduced EFC-Cal’s 
funded loans receivable by $1.8 million and in effect created another 
fictitious asset in the form of capitalized mineral exploration costs. As 
with most of the other journal entries discussed above, supporting 
documentation for these entries cannot be found. Again, the purpose 
of these entries appears to have been concealment of the fraud and 
manipulation of earnings.
Fictitious Insurance Policies
The key element of this aspect of the fraud, which began in 1969, 
was the falsification of EFLIC’s records to indicate that policies had 
been issued and continued in existence. The extent of the falsification 
can be best appreciated when viewed in terms of statistics regarding 
life insurance in force. Of the $2.2 billion in life insurance policies 
shown to be in force by EFLIC at December 31, 1971, approximately 
$1.3 billion were fictitious. Of the $3.2 billion in life insurance policies 
shown to be in force a year later, approximately $2.1 billion were 
fictitious. Substantially all of the fictitious policies were reinsured with 
other life insurance companies.
Although the use of the computer to produce fictitious records is 
discussed later in this report, the following brief description of its use at 
EFLIC will be helpful. In 1972 (and perhaps in earlier years as well), 
the computer was used to reconstruct EFLIC’s journals, insurance in 
force files, and the general ledger for the entire year, so as to spread 
the fictitious entries in an apparently normal fashion. This seems to 
have been done to avoid the suspicion which might have been aroused 
by recording all of the fictitious business in a single month or quarter. 
This reconstruction could have been achieved even if the records were 
maintained manually. However, an enormous amount of clerical work 
would have been involved. The use of the computer made the recon­
struction much easier.
To further conceal the fictitious insurance policies:
•  The liability for future policyholder benefits was duly cal­
culated on the basis of the supposed total insurance in force 
which had not been reinsured.
•  Deferred acquisition costs for the fictitious policies which had 
not been reinsured were recorded as though the policies had 
been genuine.
•  State insurance premium taxes were paid to the appropriate 
taxing authorities on fictitious as well as genuine policies.
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•  Expenses were falsified to give the appearance that a normal 
relationship existed between premium income and such expense 
accounts as commissions, credit reports and medical fees.
•  Records were further falsified to manifest a pattern of termina­
tion and death claims on the fictitious policies. Since substanti­
ally all of these policies were reinsured, a major object was to 
deceive the reinsurers.
Other measures were also taken to conceal the falsification. When, 
in the course of audit, fictitious transactions (including legitimate 
policies which had been terminated but were maintained as though 
they were still in force) were selected for audit testing, EFLIC person­
nel either created bogus documentation—including copies of policies, 
applications and medical reports— or produced documents relating to 
legitimate policies which had been terminated.
EFLIC’s premium income and commission expense accounts were 
inflated to correspond with the volume of fictitious policies. This opera­
tion was rendered easier than would normally have been the case for an 
insurance underwriter by the fact that virtually all the transactions 
passed through an affiliated entity— EFC-Cal. That is, most premiums 
were receivable from EFC-Cal, and commission expenses were pay­
able to EFC-Cal. In most instances there were no direct dealings by 
the underwriter, EFLIC, either with its policyholders (with respect to 
premium payments) or with the salesmen who sold its policies; rather, 
these transactions were conducted through its marketing affiliate, EFC- 
Cal. Nor was there a direct flow of cash with respect to either pre­
miums or commissions on “program” business; rather these were 
accumulated and reflected in offsetting intercompany accounts which 
were purportedly settled by lump-sum payments to EFLIC.
While the recording of fictitious life insurance sales by EFLIC 
and of fictitious funded loans receivable by EFC-Cal might superficially 
appear to be a single, integrated fraud, they were really two separate 
schemes to inflate assets and income. In fact, EFC-Cal’s inflation of 
funded loans receivable apparently commenced well before EFLIC 
was acquired by EFCA.  
Fictitious Securities Transactions and Their 
Relation to Intercompany Account Balances
As has been explained, intercompany receivables and payables 
between EFC-Cal and EFLIC, arising from their complementary roles 
in sales of the “Equity Funding Program,” were cleared through their
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common parent, EFCA. Clearance was desirable before year-end for 
EFLIC because, for life insurance regulatory purposes, receivables 
from affiliated companies are “non-admitted assets” which are de­
ducted from equity in determining statutory capital.
As discussed earlier, the transactions recorded in the intercompany 
accounts between EFLIC and EFCA were not correlated, and as a 
result the balances in the accounts were not equal and offsetting. To 
bring the accounts into balance, a series of fictitious purchases and 
sales of commercial paper and bonds was recorded at the end of both
1971 and 1972. The net result of these entries was as follows:
EFCA Books
Investments inflated





Balance due from EFCA decreased (16 million)
Books of Other Subsidiaries
Balance due from EFCA decreased (3 million)
1972 




To document fictitious investments, company personnel prepared 
fictitious brokerage advices reflecting purported purchases and indicat­
ing that securities were being held in safekeeping at a commercial 
bank.
EFCA also advised EFLIC on regular interest payment dates that 
interest was received on the investments. EFLIC’s records duly re­
flected this interest income with a corresponding increase in its inter­
company account receivable from EFCA.
At the end of 1972 the auditors’ request for confirmation of certain 
securities represented as being held in safekeeping by the bank was 
addressed by company personnel to a mail drop set up under a name 
similar to the bank so company personnel would receive the request, 
sign the confirmation and return it to the auditors.
Other Fictitious or Fraudulently Inflated Assets
At the date of bankruptcy the accounts of EFCA reflected the 
following additional fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets:
•  a $5.9 million receivable from insurance companies and agents,
•  a $2.9 million note receivable from the sale of future profits 
on casualty insurance agency operations,
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•  a $2.7 million investment in Bishops Bank, and
•  a $600,000 receivable from mutual funds.
The creation of the $5.9 million receivable from insurance com­
panies and agents was accomplished piecemeal. Prior to 1970, journal 
entries, for which no supporting documentation can be found, were 
recorded on the books of EFC-Cal creating a receivable due from 
insurance companies approximating $4 million and effectively increas­
ing income by a like amount. This portion of the receivable balance 
apparently remained unchanged after it was recorded. The $1.9 million 
remainder represents unreconciled differences between the control ac­
count and detail records supporting amounts due from agents. Although 
these differences existed for some time, the discrepancy was never 
charged off.
The $2.9 million notes receivable originated from the sale of 
future profits on casualty insurance agency operations of an EFCA 
subsidiary. Although there are documents in the files relating to this 
transaction, they provide, with minor exceptions, that payments are to 
be made only to the extent that the agency operation generated profits. 
The transaction appears not to have been a completed sale (although it 
was so recorded) giving rise to income at the time of the transaction. 
In addition, one of the journal entries recording the receivable for a 
significant portion of the sale reduced asset accounts unrelated to the 
casualty agency operation.
Bishops Bank was acquired by EFCA in May 1969. During 
1970, a $2.1 million fictitious cash account with Bishops Bank and 
fictitious investments in subsidiaries amounting to $600,000 were cre­
ated by means of journal entries which effectively increased EFCA’s 
income by $2.7 million. In December 1970 journal entries were made 
substituting a $2.7 million intangible asset in the nature of goodwill 
(i.e., cost of the investment in Bishops Bank in excess of net assets 
acquired) for the non-existent cash account and fictitious investment 
accounts.
During 1972, a $600,000 receivable from mutual funds was re­
corded on EFCA’s books with an offsetting credit to commission 
income. The committee was informed that documentation supporting 
the receivable does not exist.
Use of the Computer to Produce Fictitious Records
During the later years bookkeeping and accounting records, in­
cluding general ledgers, of EFCA and its subsidiaries were prepared
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almost entirely by use of a computer. Nonetheless, the fraud was not 
based on a sophisticated application of data processing technology. 
The principal falsifications were achieved by manually preparing ficti­
tious journal entries and recording them on the books of certain Equity 
Funding companies. However, the computer was used to prepare 
records in support of some of the fictitious account balances. An 
enormous amount of clerical effort would have been required to create 
the supporting detail manually.
Much of the publicity about Equity Funding has characterized 
it as a “computer fraud.” It would be more accurate to call it a “com­
puter-assisted fraud.” The computer was used, to a large extent, to 
manipulate files and create detail designed to conceal the fraud. Much 
of this processing was performed by personnel from outside the EDP 
department who were allowed access to computer hardware, software 
and files.
The computer was an important factor in carrying out measures 




Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding 
The Adequacy of Auditing Standards and 
Procedures Currently Applied in the 
Examination of Financial Statements
General Conclusion
From its review, the committee has concluded that, except for 
certain observations relating to confirmation of insurance in force and 
auditing related party transactions, generally accepted auditing stan­
dards are adequate and that no changes are called for in the procedures 
commonly used by auditors. In reaching this conclusion, the commit­
tee is aware that it is possible to hypothesize ways in which virtually 
any audit procedure may be thwarted. Nevertheless, the committee 
believes that customary audit procedures properly applied would have 
provided a reasonable degree of assurance that the existence of fraud 
at Equity Funding would be detected.
The nature, extent and timing of audit procedures are normally 
based on a study and evaluation of the system of internal control in 
existence in the area under examination. While such procedures would 
not necessarily reveal a fraud, it appears that internal accounting and 
administrative controls at Equity Funding were so weak as to raise 
concern about the reliability of the accounting records. The committee 
believes that in such circumstances customary procedures would be 
extended because of the internal control weakness, thereby enhancing 
the likelihood of detecting fraud.
The remainder of this chapter sets forth some of the audit pro­
cedures which the committee believes would customarily be applied 
in the circumstances in testing the validity of certain accounts in which 
fraudulent entries were made at Equity Funding. Each section heading 
indicates the areas toward which the selected audit procedures would 
be primarily directed. However, these audit procedures might have
27
uncovered misstatements in related areas as well. For example, dis­
covery of overstatements in the funded loan account might have led to 
the discovery of overstatements in the insurance in force, in commission 
income and in other related accounts. Similarly, discovery of an 
illogical relationship between commission income and commission ex­
pense might have led to discovery of the overstatement of funded loans.
Fictitious Funded Loans Receivable
The committee believes that the following customary audit pro­
cedures taken together would provide a reasonable degree of assur­
ance that fictitious funded loans receivable would be detected:
•  Prepare under the auditor’s control a trial balance of funded 
loans receivable showing borrowers’ names, full account num­
bers and balances.
•  Reconcile the trial balance total with the general ledger control 
account balance and ascertain the propriety of any reconciling 
items.
•  Review on a test basis the entries recording additions and 
deductions in the funded loans receivable account and examine 
documentation supporting the changes.
•  Request on a test basis confirmation from borrowers of loan 
balances and amount of collateral pledged.
•  On a test basis, inspect, or request confirmation from cus­
todians of, mutual fund shares pledged as collateral by individ­
ual borrowers.
The auditor could carry out the above audit procedures relating 
to the trial balance and confirmation of funded loans receivable manu­
ally or through the use of computer programs designed for that pur­
pose. If a client’s computer programs were utilized the auditor would 
review and test such programs to the extent necessary to satisfy himself 
that they would produce valid data. To conduct such a review an 
auditor should have adequate technical training and proficiency in EDP 
techniques.
Fictitious Commission Income and Expense
The committee believes that the following customary auditing 
procedures taken together would provide a reasonable degree of as­
surance that fictitious EFC-Cal commission income and expense would 
be detected:
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•  Select a sample from the additions to the commission income 
account and trace the origin of such additions to supporting 
detail. Recalculate commissions earned on a test basis.
•  Select a sample from the additions to the commission expense 
account and trace the origin of such additions to supporting 
detail. Recalculate commission expense on a test basis.
•  Determine whether a logical relationship exists between insur­
ance commission income and insurance commission expense.
•  Test other major sources of commission income by examining 
supporting documentation or by confirming with the sources of 
such income.
•  Review propriety of consolidation elimination and reclassifica­
tion entries affecting insurance commission income and expense.
•  Test overall reasonableness of insurance commission income by 
comparing it with first year and renewal premium data.
In the audit of commission income and expense the auditor would 
be cognizant of the relationship between premium volume and insur­
ance commissions. An awareness of this relationship and more particu­
larly, an awareness of that portion of premium volume attributable to 
first year sales as distinguished from renewals would permit the auditor 
to determine the overall reasonableness of recorded insurance commis­
sion revenue. Similarly, the overall propriety of recorded insurance 
commission expense would be established in light of gross premium or 
commission income and the provisions of agents’ commission contracts.
Fictitious Life Insurance Policies
The committee believes that the following customary auditing 
procedures taken together would provide a reasonable degree of 
assurance that fictitious life insurance policies included in the inventory 
of insurance in force would be detected:
•  On a test basis trace policies included in the inventory of insur­
ance in force to the related premium collection.
•  On a test basis trace premium income to premium collections 
and the related policies to the inventory of insurance in force.
Since EFLIC received no cash when it wrote new “program” poli­
cies, premiums could not be traced to specifically identifiable cash 
collections within its own records. Premiums on such policies were 
merely recorded as a charge to EFLIC’s intercompany receivable due
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from EFC-Cal and immediately offset by a credit in the same amount 
representing the first year commission. Thus, the only independent 
evidence to support premiums on new “program” business was the note 
receivable representing a loan made by EFC-Cal to finance the assured’s 
premium.
Similar tests tracing evidence of billing and collection would be 
applied to renewal premiums. Again, in the case of “program” sales, 
such premiums were added to income and charged by EFLIC to its 
intercompany account receivable due from EFC-Cal. While the inter­
company account balances were settled periodically, settlements were 
made on a lump sum basis making it impossible to trace specific 
premiums to specific cash collections as would customarily be the case.
To perform these audit tests it would be necessary to work with 
the records of both EFLIC and EFC-Cal, since EFC-Cal maintained 
the related loan account and billing and commission records in con­
nection with its sales of EFLIC policies. Entries recording premium 
income and commission expense on EFLIC’s books for policies sold 
by EFC-Cal were based solely on intercompany advices from EFC-Cal. 
Thus, an auditor could not trace premiums on “program” policies to 
evidence of billing and collection without gaining access to EFC-Cal’s 
records. Under these circumstances, the auditor of EFLIC would 
either test the records of EFC-Cal himself or, if the two companies 
engaged separate auditors, EFLIC’s auditor might request and rely 
upon EFC-Cal’s auditor to carry out tests using data supplied by him 
from EFLIC’s inventory of policies in force. In addition, EFC-Cal’s 
commission income and premiums remitted would be compared on a 
test basis with premium income and commission expense on EFLIC’s 
books to see if they corresponded.
Another auditing procedure, which heretofore has not been con­
sidered particularly useful, is verification of the authenticity of a selected 
number of policies included in the in force inventory by direct confirma­
tion with the policyholders. Such a procedure has not generally been 
considered necessary because it would be unusual for companies to 
overstate liabilities. Inflation of the inventory of life insurance in 
force by a company that follows statutory accounting would result in 
an overstatement of the liability for future policyholder benefits and a 
reduction in current earnings. However, when companies report on 
the basis of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) there 
could be motivation for overstating insurance in force because it 
could result in an addition to current earnings.
There could be an additional motivation for overstating insurance 
in force when reinsurance of policies has the effect of materially increas­
ing current earnings, which can occur when a company reports on the
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basis of either GAAP or statutory accounting. Reinsurance of life 
insurance policies permits the elimination of the related liability for 
future policyholder benefits. Under certain circumstances, reinsurance 
may also result in increasing current earnings to the extent that the 
proceeds received from reinsurance exceed expenses incurred in con­
nection with the sale and servicing of the reinsured policies.
EFLIC reinsured substantial numbers of both bona fide and fictitious 
policies. Thus, fictitiously inflating the in force inventory, coupled 
with the manner in which reinsurance commissions were accounted for, 
resulted in substantially increasing EFLIC’s reported earnings.
The committee believes that when current earnings of a company 
could be materially increased as a result of either the reinsurance of 
policies or reporting on the basis of GAAP, there may be occasions 
when policies should be confirmed with policyholders on a test basis. 
Nevertheless, the committee cautions against placing too much reliance 
on such confirmation procedures as a sole means of determining the 
reasonableness of the in force inventory since such procedures cannot 
be expected to disclose unrecorded policies.
The committee recommends, therefore, that the Institute’s auditing 
standards executive committee consider whether the Life Insurance 
Audit Guide requires clarification with regard to the confirmation of 
policies with policyholders.
Fictitious Securities Transactions
As discussed in Chapter 3, fictitious purchases of investments were 
recorded in 1971 and 1972 by EFCA and EFLIC to substitute for 
intercompany account balances between EFCA and EFLIC. The 
committee believes that the customary audit procedures of inspection of 
the securities held by the company or confirmation of the securities in 
safekeeping directly with an independent custodian would provide a 
reasonable degree of assurance that the non-existence of securities would 
be revealed.
In connection with the fictitious investments recorded on the books 
of EFLIC at December 31, 1972, the Report of the Trustee of Equity 
Funding Corporation of America dated October 31, 1974, states that 
Equity Funding established an office in Chicago using a name very close 
to that of American National Bank and Trust Co. by leasing space at a 
different address under the name of “American National Trust.” The 
report states:
From time to time thereafter, fraud participants sent letters ad­
dressed to “American National Bank” at the mail drop address to ac­
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custom post office employees to delivering mail so addressed to the 
bogus location.
A print-out of the bogus bond portfolio was prepared on EFCA’s 
System /3 computer, and was given to . . .  (the auditors) during the
1972 audit to support purchases of $24 million of the bonds at 
American National Bank. When the auditors also requested a direct 
bank confirmation for the bogus bonds, a request for confirmation was 
prepared, addressed to the fictitious branch office and given to them for 
mailing. . . . (An officer of EFCA) went to Chicago to receive it at 
the phony American National Bank branch. Nothing was received for 
a period of several days, causing great consternation among the con­
spirators who feared that the post office had delivered the request to 
the real American National Bank and Trust Co. However, they later 
learned that . . . (the auditors) simply forgot to mail the confirmation 
request. . . . When the auditors’ confirmation finally arrived at the mail 
drop . . . (an officer of EFCA) apparently signed and returned it to 
them in Los Angeles. In this manner, the conspirators concealed the 
$24 million imbalance in the intercompany account on EFLIC’s books 
at year-end 1972.
While this points up the need for auditors to ascertain that valid 
addresses are used, such a step is already a customary and integral 
part of confirmation procedures.
An auditor customarily compares recorded security transactions 
with supporting broker or bank advices. However, this procedure prob­
ably would have been ineffective because certain advices had been 
forged.
Other Fictitious Receivables and Fraudulently Inflated Assets
With respect to the receivables resulting from the sale of the 
casualty insurance agency operation, the committee believes that the 
following customary audit procedures taken together would raise serious 
questions as to whether the receivables were valid:
•  Analyze the accounts and review supporting data including 
contracts or agreements.
•  Examine recent financial statements and credit ratings of the 
debtors to establish the financial standing of debtors.
•  Confirm unpaid balances directly with the debtors.
Although the above auditing procedures would customarily be 
applied to the Estudios and Grandson receivables, the committee is of
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the opinion that these procedures might have been ineffective in 
detecting the fraudulent nature of these accounts since the Trustee has 
determined that both companies were secretly controlled by EFCA. 
These audit procedures could have been circumvented through manage­
ment collusion.
As to the investment in the commercial paper of Apatex, the 
committee is of the opinion that customary auditing procedures 
(described in the section Fictitious Securities Transactions) might not 
have disclosed that the asset was fictitious. This opinion is based on 
the following:
1. Forged purchase advices were available for inspection.
2. The commercial paper was supposedly held by Bishops Bank, an 
EFCA subsidiary. Confirmation from the bank that it was holding 
the paper would not have furnished adequate audit evidence because 
the bank was not an independent custodian.
3. The bank made a market in this commercial paper and may have 
had such securities on hand for sale. Accordingly, inspection of 
$2 million of Apatex commercial paper would have given no 
assurance that the paper inspected was the property of EFC-Cal.
Circumstances such as those which were present regarding the 
Estudios, Grandson and Apatex accounts highlight the fact that trans­
actions between related parties pose serious auditing problems. The 
committee did not attempt to reach any conclusions regarding the 
problems inherent in auditing such transactions since the auditing stan­
dards executive committee of the AICPA is currently studying the need 
for additional auditing procedures in connection with related party 
transactions.
With respect to the $5.9 million receivable from insurance com­
panies and from agents, the committee believes that the following cus­
tomary auditing procedures taken together would provide a reasonable 
degree of assurance that the highly questionable nature of the accounts 
would be disclosed.
As to the approximately $4 million receivable from insurance 
companies:
•  Analyze the account balance (which would have shown that it 
had remained unchanged for several years).
•  R eview  com m ission collections early in the subsequent year 
which were applicable to the year-end balance under audit.
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As to the approximately $1.9 million receivable from agents 
representing unreconciled differences between the control account total 
and total of the subsidiary records:
•  Review the company’s method of clearing unreconciled differ­
ences.
•  Inquire as to why the difference had not been written off.
With respect to the inflated investment in Bishop’s Bank, the com­
mittee is of the opinion that customary auditing procedures would 
have included a review of the net change in the “goodwill” account 
which was recorded on the books of EFCA. Such a review would 
provide a reasonable degree of assurance that the inflated account 
would be discovered.
In regard to the capitalized mineral exploration costs, the commit­
tee believes that an attempt to review data supporting the journal entries 
which gave rise to deferral of such costs would provide reasonable 
assurance that the impropriety of the asset would be discovered.
Use of the Computer
In the opinion of the committee, a knowledge of computer audit 
techniques was not essential to the detection of the Equity Funding 
fraud. Manual application of customary auditing procedures would 
have provided a reasonable degree of assurance that the fraud would 
be uncovered.
The committee also believes that the fraud did not contain any 
elements that involved new or unique computer applications. Thus, 
no recommendations are made for any new auditing standards or pro­
cedures in regard to computer maintained financial records.
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Chapter 5
Responsibility of Auditors for Detection of Fraud
The extensive fraud at Equity Funding raises fundamental concept­
ual and practical questions about the responsibility of auditors for 
detection of fraud, and about the understanding of that responsibility by 
both the accounting profession and the public. The committee believes 
it should address these questions even though it has concluded that 
no significant changes in generally accepted auditing standards and 
procedures are necessary in the light of Equity Funding.
The understanding of the public accounting profession as to its 
responsibility for detection of fraud is set forth in Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 1, in sections 110.05, .06, .07 and .08, which are 
reproduced in the Appendix. The propositions contained in that State­
ment relate to the ten generally accepted auditing standards, which 
govern the auditor’s work in examining financial statements. One of 
these standards requires that the auditor make a proper study and 
evaluation of internal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for 
the determination of the extent of the tests to which auditing procedures 
are to be restricted. Thus, in the presence of weakness in internal 
control, the auditor recognizes the possibility that fraud could go un­
detected; and, correspondingly, modification of the nature, extent and 
timing of audit tests may be considered necessary.
The ten standards also require adequate technical training and 
proficiency as an auditor, independence in mental attitude, exercise of 
due professional care, adequate planning and supervision, and sufficient 
competent evidential matter to support the auditor’s opinion on the
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financial statements being examined. The auditor’s report explicity 
states whether his examination has met these standards.
In meeting these standards, the auditor’s attitude is one of aware­
ness of the possibility of fraud. Many customary auditing procedures, 
though not specifically aimed at fraud detection, are nonetheless designed 
to test the reliability of the books and records and may raise questions 
as to the possibility of fraud. If the auditor suspects that there is a 
lack of honesty affecting the records or financial statements, he should 
modify the nature, extent and timing of his tests so as to either confirm 
or dispel his suspicion.
Although an auditor’s unqualified opinion provides a degree of 
assurance that there is no material fraud, the committee believes that 
there is a risk that the opinion may be misunderstood as providing a 
higher degree of assurance as to the absence of fraud than can reason­
ably be expected. If such misunderstanding is to be avoided, it is im­
portant that the inescapable limitations on an audit be understood.
SAS No. 1, section 110.06, states that the auditor cannot give 
assurance that all types of fraud have been detected even when the 
most extensive audit has been conducted. Three examples are given: 
forgery, collusion and unrecorded transactions.
Forgery may be employed as to signatures and other signs of 
authenticity, or to entire documents. Throughout history skillful forgers 
have eluded detection even by experts; and auditors cannot reasonably 
be expected to be handwriting or documentary experts.
Collusion— as between client personnel and outsiders, or among 
management or employees of the client—may result in the presentation 
to the auditor of falsified confirmations or other documents that appear 
genuine. If the auditor has no reason to suspect the genuineness of the 
documents, it would be reasonable for him to rely on them. In a scheme 
to conceal fraud, of course, there is likely to be a combination of 
forgery and collusion.
Finally, auditing techniques cannot provide assurance that there 
are no unrecorded transactions. For example, a payable may be con­
cealed, and little short of requesting confirmation from every possible 
creditor would provide assurance of its discovery.
In addition to the foregoing limitations which are largely insur­
mountable, there are practical and economic limitations on the degree 
of assurance that auditors can reasonably be expected to provide. An 
ordinary audit is not an examination of every transaction and of every 
document relating to every transaction; rather, an audit involves a test­
ing of transactions and of the related underlying records and other docu­
ments. The nature, extent and timing of the testing depend upon a
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number of factors, including the auditor’s study and evaluation of the 
client’s internal control, the results of particular tests, the importance 
of particular items being tested, and whether grounds for suspicion of 
fraud are discovered in the course of the audit. In the usual case, to 
substitute for such an examination one covering every transaction and 
record of the client would multiply the amount of work involved to an 
impracticable degree.
“Detailed” audits, which may be undertaken for special purposes, 
offer a greater likelihood of detecting fraud because they ordinarily 
involve examination of larger numbers of individual items and trans­
actions than the ordinary audit. Even in detailed audits, however, some 
types of fraud may escape detection (e.g., unrecorded transactions, 
forgery, or collusion) because there is necessarily a point where the 
auditor’s inquiry stops.
In every audit, the auditor is expected to be aware of the possibility 
of fraud. Nonetheless, there must come a point where, unless he has 
reason for suspicion, the auditor accepts the truth of representations 
made to him and the genuineness of documents which he inspects. 
Examples of representations which would normally be accepted (in 
the absence of specific reasons for suspicion) even though they might 
be deliberately false would be representations by management as to the 
completeness of a set of board or executive committee minutes; or by 
the client’s counsel as to the absence of pending material litigation; 
or by a debtor of the client as to the correctness of an account re­
ceivable; or by a bank or depository as to the status of the client’s 
accounts with it.
Yet there will almost always be some further step that could be 
taken to corroborate the accuracy of the representation made to the 
auditor. For example, a debtor’s response to a request for confirmation 
of an account receivable could be checked by inspection of the debtor’s 
records reflecting the corresponding account payable, or by a certificate 
from the debtor’s auditor. If the representation is one of counsel, the 
auditor could ask to inspect the pleadings in the case, he could examine 
the court records, or he could require an opinion of his own counsel 
with respect to the opinion of the client’s counsel, and so on. Each such 
incremental step would add a degree of confidence, and yet in few 
cases would it produce absolute certainty.
Similarly, there is a point where, again assuming that he has no 
reason for suspicion, the auditor accepts the genuineness of documents: 
as, for example, the genuineness of securities held by the client and 
inspected by the auditor, even though these might be skillfully counter­
feited; or of contracts or signatures on confirmations, although these
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might be forged; or of underlying internal documents, although the 
availability of the client’s own forms often makes these relatively easy 
to falsify. As to any such matter, there is ordinarily some further step 
that could be taken to test the authenticity of a document on which re­
liance is placed: the authority of a debtor’s officer or employee to sign a 
confirmation could be authenticated; the genuineness of that person’s 
signature could be verified; the authority of the authenticating officer 
could itself be authenticated, and the genuineness of that signature 
checked, and so on. Again each additional step would produce another 
degree of confidence, still without achieving complete certainty.
Absolute certainty is no more an attainable goal of auditing than 
it is of any other professional endeavor. What is sought is a reasonable 
degree of assurance; and what is applied to achieve such reasonable 
assurance is and must be a professional judgment as to how far inquiry 
should go. The necessity for such a judgment reflects the fact that there 
is no ultimate stopping place: each new level of test offers yet another 
choice between reliance or still a further test. It reflects the fact that 
each incremental step would increase the work involved and therefore 
the cost and duration of the audit, without promising ultimate certainty.
The question may be raised whether, even if in ordinary circum­
stances audits cannot reasonably be expected to detect all material 
fraud, the expectation should not be different when, as in Equity Fund­
ing, the fraud is a “massive” one. In other words, it might be suggested 
that, assuming the term “massive” could be given a concrete definition, 
auditing standards should be such that an auditor’s opinion would in­
variably constitute a reasonable assurance that no “massive” fraud 
existed such as in Equity Funding. The committee does not believe that 
such a suggestion is sound.
On analysis, three fairly distinct meanings might be assigned to the 
term “massive” : referring to size—the numerical magnitude of the falsi­
fied figures or of the losses incurred by investors and others as a result of 
the fraud; referring to the extent of the collusion—the number of per­
sons involved in the fraudulent scheme and the elaborateness of that 
scheme; and referring to the number of accounts affected. There is, of 
course, some connection between these several dimensions of the term, 
since it is often the case that the larger dollar amounts of falsifica­
tion, the more accounts will be tainted and the more elaborate will be 
the precautions necessary to avoid detection of the falsification.
In any of these senses, the more massive a fraud, the greater will be 
the likelihood of its detection by customary audit tests. The larger the 
number of accounts and records affected by the falsification, the larger 
will be the number of potential audit trails leading to its discovery. The
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larger the dollar amount of falsification resulting from the fraud, the 
more likely it will be that the fraud will continue and enlarge from year 
to year; and the longer the fraud continues, the greater will be the 
chances of its coming to light in one way or another. Moreover, the 
more extensive the collusion, the more numerous will be the persons 
who may intentionally or inadvertently betray their guilty knowledge or 
behave in a manner that will arouse suspicion.
On the other hand, the more skillful the collusion, the less likely 
will be the discovery of the fraud—regardless of its massiveness in the 
sense of size or numbers of accounts affected. Fraudulent devices such 
as forgery and the failure to record transactions are virtually impossible 
to detect by ordinary auditing, and as to any given auditing procedure, 
techniques can be devised that will offer reasonable promise of circum­
venting the procedure in question. Thus, there remains the possibility 
that even a massive fraud can escape detection by an audit conducted 
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
It may fairly be said that the more massive the fraud the more 
likely it is to be detected in a conventional audit; nonetheless there is no 
definable degree of massiveness as to which such an audit can invariably 
be relied upon for such detection. Nor, in the committee’s view, is there 
any practicable means of altering auditing standards or procedures so 
as to provide such an absolute assurance with respect to any set degree 
of massiveness.
In sum, the committee reaffirms the soundness of the accounting 
profession’s understanding with respect to the role of audits in the de­
tection of fraud. A change in this basic understanding to make the 
auditor’s opinion into more of a guarantee of the absence of fraud 
would represent a major change in the conception and performance of 
audits and would vastly increase their expense—yet still not furnish a 
complete guarantee. To ask that a professional opinion be made into 
an absolute assurance would, moreover, be to seek a degree of certainty 
which is seldom to be found in any other area of commercial life— or, 
for that matter, in any area of our lives, private or public. However, 
even though such absolute assurance is not feasible, the application of 
generally accepted auditing standards will often result in the discovery 
of material frauds. Audits also can be expected to deter frauds which 
might otherwise occur.
Having said all this, the committee is still concerned that there 
may be a divergence in the understanding of the public and of the ac­
counting profession with respect to the auditor’s responsibility for de­
tection of fraud. Although the committee believes that all of the propo­
sitions contained in SAS No. 1, sections 110.05, .06, .07 and .08, are
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sound, it also concludes that the way they are cast, with its greater 
emphasis on the limitations rather than on the positive aspects of the 
matter, may contribute to the risk of disparity in understanding, between 
the public at large and the public accounting profession, as to what an 
auditor’s responsibility is with respect to the detection of fraud.
On one hand, there seems to be a tendency to view auditors’ re­
ports as if they were warranties— absolute assurances against fraud or 
error— and to ignore the practical limitations on auditors’ work, which 
SAS No. 1 emphasizes. On the other hand, those limitations, even 
though well understood by the profession, may not be expressed in a 
persuasive way. The committee believes that a more detailed statement 
of both the auditor’s responsibilities and the limitations of those re­
sponsibilities might well be helpful in reducing such misunderstanding. 
It therefore recommends that the auditing standards executive committee 
consider restating those sections of SAS No. 1 which relate to the audi­
tor’s responsibility for detection of fraud.
In this respect, it seems clear that the auditor has an obligation to 
discover material frauds that are discoverable through application of 
customary auditing procedures applied in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards. The auditing profession should, on an on­
going basis, continue to improve the efficiency of customary audit pro­
cedures to the end that probability of discovery of material frauds con­
tinues to increase within the limits of practicability.
Respectfully Submitted by the 
Special Committee on Equity Funding
Marvin L. Stone, Chairman 
J. T. Arenberg, Jr.
Leo E. Burger 






Dissent to Publication at This Time
Messrs. Arenberg and Holsen dissent to the publication of this 
Report prior to the termination of significant litigation involving Equity 
Funding because (a) the rights of certain litigants may be unfairly 
affected by the premature publication of this Report, (b) new informa­
tion that may be brought out during the course of the litigation could, 
as indicated on page 9 of the Report, affect the committee’s conclu­
sions, so that publication would turn out to have been premature, and 
(c) the absence of recommendations for changes in auditing procedures 
may lead some readers of the Report to believe that the audits were 
deficient even though the committee, in keeping with its charge, made 
no attempt to assess fault. In addition, they believe that publication 
of the Report at this time may establish an unwarranted and potentially 
dangerous precedent, particularly when, as in this instance, there has 




Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, 
Section 110—Paragraphs .05, .06, .07 and .08
Detection of Fraud
.05 In making the ordinary examination, the independent auditor 
is aware of the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements 
may be misstated as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, 
or deliberate misrepresentation by management, or both. The auditor 
recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on 
the financial statements, and his examination, made in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards, gives consideration to this possi­
bility. However, the ordinary examination directed to the expression of 
an opinion on financial statements is not primarily or specifically de­
signed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other 
similar irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, al­
though the discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is 
usually more closely associated with the objective of the ordinary ex­
amination, such examination cannot be relied upon to assure its dis­
covery. The responsibility of the independent auditor for failure to 
detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to clients and others) arises 
only when such failure clearly results from failure to comply with gen­
erally accepted auditing standards.
.06 Reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be 
placed principally upon an adequate accounting system with appropriate
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internal control. The well-established practice of the independent audi­
tor of evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of the system of internal 
control by testing the accounting records and related data and by relying 
on such evaluation for the selection and timing of his other auditing pro­
cedures has generally proved sufficient for making an adequate examina­
tion. If an objective of an independent auditor’s examination were the 
discovery of all fraud, he would have to extend his work to a point where 
its cost would be prohibitive. Even then he could not give assurance 
that all types of fraud had been detected, or that none existed, because 
items such as unrecorded transactions, forgeries, and collusive fraud 
would not necessarily be uncovered. Accordingly, it is generally recog­
nized that good internal control and fidelity bonds provide protection 
more economically and effectively. In the case of fidelity bonds, pro­
tection is afforded not only by the indemnification for discovered defal­
cations but also by the possible deterrent effect upon employees; the 
presence of fidelity bonds, however, should not affect the scope of the 
auditor’s examination.
.07 When an independent auditor’s examination leading to an 
opinion on financial statements discloses specific circumstances that 
make him suspect that fraud may exist, he should decide whether the 
fraud, if in fact it should exist, might be of such magnitude as to affect 
his opinion on the financial statements. If the independent auditor be­
lieves that fraud so material as to affect his opinion may have occurred, 
he should reach an understanding with the proper representatives of the 
client as to whether the auditor or the client, subject to the auditor’s re­
view, is to make the investigation necessary to determine whether fraud 
has in fact occurred, and, if so, the amount thereof. If, on the other 
hand, the independent auditor concludes that any such fraud could not 
be so material as to affect his opinion, he should refer the matter to the 
proper representatives of the client with the recommendation that it be 
pursued to a conclusion. For example, frauds involving “lapping” ac­
counts receivable collections, or frauds involving overstatements of in­
ventory, could be material, while those involving peculations from a 
small imprest fund would normally be of little significance because the 
operation and size of the fund tend to establish a limitation.
.08 The subsequent discovery that fraud existed during the period 
covered by the independent auditor’s examination does not of itself indi­
cate negligence on his part. He is not an insurer or guarantor; if his 
examination was made with due professional skill and care in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards, he has fulfilled all of the obli­
gations implicit in his undertaking.
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